The role of resistance in the politics of modern representative democracies is historically contested, and remains far from clear. This article seeks to explore historical thinking on this subject through a discussion of what Benjamin Constant and Alexis de Tocqueville had to say about resistance and its relationship to "representative government" and democracy. Neither thinker is usually seen as a significant contributor to "resistance theory" as this category is conventionally understood. But, in addition to their more familiar preoccupations with securing limitations on the exercise of political authority and averting majority tyranny, both thinkers wrote extensively on the nature and meanings of resistance in "representative governments" or democratic societies. Both thinkers are examined in the context of revolutionary and Napoleonic discussions about the legitimacy of resistance or "right to resist" oppression, and against eighteenth-century discussions of the "spirit of resistance" since Montesquieu. The article notes conceptual distinctions between resistance, revolution and insurrection in the period, and addresses the broader question of the extent to which early nineteenth-century French liberals sought to "institutionalise" principles of resistance within modern constitutional frameworks.
Introduction
What is the role of resistance in the politics of modern representative democracies? The answer to this question seems more complicated than perhaps it initially appears. At first glance, it is tempting to assume that resistance is one of the essential democratic ideals, a bulwark of popular rights and freedoms against executive encroachment -something that distinguishes healthy democracies from those authoritarian regimes that brook no dissent.
But a little reflection immediately complicates this picture. In the first place, many theorists of representative government have been at pains to rule out the legitimacy of collective resistance to the decisions of duly authorised representatives -especially if there is no "people" prior to its representation. 1 There also seems to be a real difficulty in identifying criteria for resisting representatives to whom we have notionally given our consent. Others have suggested that the institutional mechanisms of constitutional democracy have superseded earlier forms of civic resistance, as increasingly complex systems of popular representation, political parties, checks and balances, veto and judicial review now do the job of maintaining the rectitude of governments. 2 Still others have articulated the rival view that in democratic states the collective body of the people might itself require resisting, a position that resonates with historical anxieties about legislative despotism and majority tyranny as well as more contemporary worries about plebiscites and referenda. Put bluntly, the role of resistance in representative democracies is far from clear, and requires further investigation.
My aim in this paper is to tease out some of these complexities through a discussion of what Benjamin Constant and Alexis de Tocqueville had to say about resistance and its relationship to "representative government" and democracy. Neither thinker is usually seen as a significant contributor to "resistance theory" as this category is conventionally understood. Politique (which drew from Locke in setting the principle of resistance against that of prerogative). 6 The theme was also a significant one in the writings of Constant and
Tocqueville. Both authors, despite significant differences between them, suggested that the rise of democratically-legitimated states in post-revolutionary Europe rendered the question of resistance newly problematic. Constant's account was distinctive in relating resistance to what we might term plebiscitary democracy (a phrase Constant did not use), especially as this was understood in the light of Napoleon Bonaparte's claim to embody the sovereignty of the people. 7 Tocqueville, while he certainly recognised this issue, went further in confronting the ways in which the relentless progress of administrative centralization, equality of conditions, and commerce might erode the capacity for civic resistance among modern democratic citizens. 8 Both thinkers posed a range of more general questions about the relationship between resistance and revolution, resistance and constitutionalism, and about the kinds of moral and civic qualities and institutional structures needed to sustain resistance in democratic ages.
relevance to Constant, see especially Richard Whatmore, " The French under the monarchy were not completely derived of political rights until after Richelieu. I have already said that defective institutions which nevertheless endow the powerful classes with certain privileges they are ceaselessly busy in defending have, in their favour, amid their many disadvantages, the fact that they do not leave the whole nation to degradation and debasement. The beginning of the reign of Louis XIV was still disrupted by the war of the Fronde, a puerile war in truth, but one which was the residuum of a spirit of resistance, habituated to action and continuing to act almost without purpose. Despotism grew greatly towards the end of this reign.
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This picture stood in contrast with the diminished capacity for resisting sovereign power in post-revolutionary societies. Here again Constant drew upon Montesquieu, responding specifically to Montesquieu's chapter "On Ideas of Uniformity" in his own chapter with that title. 23 Montesquieu's discussion of the mania for uniformity may have caught Constant's eye because it resonated with his own hostility towards the obsessive desire of modern politicians to establish a "smooth surface over which the lofty eye of government can freely stray, without encountering any inequality which offends it or obstructs its view." 24 Again, this had implications for resistance. In an earlier passage which reads as a not-so-veiled critique of the Napoleonic regime, Constant suggested that the combination of a commercialised economy with a fierce drive towards administrative uniformity was depriving the subjects of modern states of their capacity for resisting the mechanisms of power:
Everything is more expensive because men insist on payment for being reduced to the level of mere machines. Money has to take over the functions of opinion, imitation, and honour. Everything is harder, because nothing is voluntary. The government is obeyed rather than supported. At the least interruption all the cogs stop operating. It is like a game of chess. The essential point is that Constant considered the Revolution and its Napoleonic aftermath to have decisively undermined the ability of citizens to resist sovereign power. The main claim was that successive Jacobin and Napoleonic articulations of the principle of popular sovereignty had contributed to a form of plebiscitary democracy that ruled out both individual resistance to sovereign power and any real responsibility on the part of political rulers. The problem with this understanding of democracy did not spring from its grounding on majority rule, but rather from the absence of any meaningful distinction between the people and its representatives (due to what Molé described as their total "identification"), and the resulting absence of any meaningful restrictions upon state power. 26 At the same time, the defective but sturdy aristocratic institutions that had sustained resistance in the monarchical past had now given way to an obsessively centralizing administrative state (the contemporary German term was "state-machine") that reduced individuals to cogs in a machine. 27 The problem of resistance was thus related to Constant's broader evaluation of the central paradox of the Revolution itself, which was that a revolution accomplished in the name of popular rights and liberties should have resulted in a more unlimited form of state power and correspondingly diminished protections for individual rights. 28 Any viable account of modern representative government thus had to make room for some form of resistance to power.
Between passive obedience and revolution: Constant on legitimate resistance
While the main task in what follows is to understand the role Constant ascribed to resistance in his alternative conception of representative government, we first need to consider his to establish a more normative set of criteria for legitimate resistance. This he attempted to do most systematically in Book XVIII of the Principles, which was entitled "On the Duties of Individuals to Political Authority," and which dealt with a number of longstanding questions in the subject of political obligation. 29 His starting point -in a chapter entitled "Difficulties Constant developed several lines of argument against these doctrines of "boundless obedience to law" which had immediate implications for his thinking about resistance. The baseline was his conception of an inviolable sphere of individual rights, which for him set clear limits to the permissible scope of political power and authority. Even more fundamentally, however, his criticism of passive obedience stemmed from his conception of human beings as autonomous moral agents. As he pointed out in the 1815 version of the Principles, nobody would condemn a soldier who had refused to follow the order of his drunken corporal to shoot his own captain. This was Constant's way of pointing out that mankind's natural moral capacity for "intelligence and reflection" inevitably intervened in judgements of obedience and resistance, enabling subjects to distinguish "right from violence." Theorists who denied this capacity for moral reflection were threatening to "let loose upon human society instruments of arbitrariness and oppression which any blind or furious power may unleash at will." 35 But the fundamental point was that individuals possessed a kind of moral conscience, violations of which provided a clear justification for disobedience and resistance:
As long as a law, although bad, does not tend to deprave us, as long as the encroachments of government demand only sacrifices which render us neither base nor savage, we can acquiesce in them. We compromise only on our own behalf. If the law demands, however, that we trample on our affections or duties, if, on the absurd pretext of a gigantic and false devotion to which it by turns calls monarchy or republic, or prince, or nation, it forbids us fidelity to friends in need, if it demands from us treachery to our allies, or even the persecution of vanquished foes, then anathema and disobedience to this corrupting government and to the drafting of injustices and crimes which it decorates with the name of law. Constant's other major aim in Book XVIII was to distinguish legitimate resistance from a more thoroughgoing right to revolution. As he put it in the notes, there was a significant gap between resistance, which tended simply to "repulse oppression," and revolution, which aimed to "organize government under new forms." 39 Resistance was a right, and could be activated whenever individual rights (or those of minorities) were violated. Revolution, by contrast, was never a right, and it was naïve to think that the legitimacy of revolution could be decided in advance by an appeal to fixed rules. Indeed, revolutions were better seen naturalistically as quasi-physical events ("physical upheavals," "ungovernable waves") that resulted from the specific constellation of public opinion at a given moment. 40 Here, Constant explicitly adapted Hume's famous dictum that authority rested ultimately upon opinion to emphasise that revolutions could not be decided in advance by a kind of juridical calculus. 41 The emphasis on public opinion, however, also provided a baseline for distinguishing between revolutions that could be endorsed, and those that had to be condemned. 
Constant on resistance in institutions
We are now in a better position to reassess the place of resistance in Constant's wider conception of representative government, and to consider more precisely Garsten's suggestion that Constant sought to institutionalise resistance within post-revolutionary states.
While his comments on this broader topic were spread across the text of the Principles, they reveal his consistent anxiety about the difficulties of resisting highly centralized postrevolutionary governments, and his search for alternative bases for resistance in the modern world. A crucial question here, which to some extent mirrors traditional scholarly disputes about the overall character of Constant's liberalism, was whether the practice of resistance demanded a degree of civic virtue or public spirit among citizens, or whether it could be sustained through institutional mechanisms alone. The second line of argument centred on the possibility of building resistance into the structure of the constitution itself. Two main possibilities suggested themselves. First, Constant emphasised the historical role played by an independent judiciary in resisting sovereign power. His main example was drawn from seventeenth-century English history:
As long as due process subsists, the courts will put in despotism's path a resistance, more or less generous, but which always seeks to contain it. Under Charles I, the English courts acquitted several friends of liberty, despite threats from the Court.
Under Cromwell, although dominated by the Protector, they often set free citizens accused of royalism. 
Tocqueville on democracy and resistance
Tocqueville's discussion of resistance was much more dispersed than Constant's, and his works contained nothing equivalent to the detailed examination of the principles of political Tocqueville's discussion was also firmly rooted in the context of the 1830s. Contemporaries frequently framed the July Revolution of 1830 as a successful and legal act of resistance against the violations of the Charte by the unjust and arbitrary government of Charles X. 67 More widely, the 1820s and early 1830s saw episodes of transnational resistance to monarchical empires, notably in Greece and Poland. 68 There was a revival of interest in the principles of resistance within German and Swiss liberal circles following the famous
Hambacher Fest of 1832. 69 Tocqueville himself justified his own support for the new regime of Louis-Philippe in the language of resistance, declaring that "resistance seemed legitimate to me and that I would resist in my narrow sphere." 70 He repeated this account in his Souvenirs, where he noted that Charles X had "violated rights that were dear to me, and I was able to hope that my country's freedom would be revived rather than extinguished by his fall." 71 It is worth contrasting this with Tocqueville's assessment of the events of 1848-49, which he characterised, more negatively, as an insurrection -or, more accurately, as a cycle of insurrections. 72 In distinguishing resistance and insurrection, Tocqueville did not go quite as far as the Doctrinaire thinker and politician, François Guizot, whose leadership of the parti de résistance blunted the radical potential of the term and associated it with a more conservative politics. 73 But he did seek to distinguish a more moderate form of resistance
To appreciate the significance of resistance to Tocqueville's thinking about modern democracy we need, however, to look more closely at Democracy in America itself, especially its first (1835) volume. And what is immediately striking about that text is the extent to which Tocqueville framed his analysis of democracy in terms of a diminished capacity for resistance to sovereign power. One reason for the weakness of resistance under democracies stemmed from the "absolute" nature of majority rule. As he announced in the famous chapter "Of the Omnipotence of the Majority in the United States and Its Effects,"
"the very essence of democratic government is that the dominion of the majority be absolute;
for in democracies, nothing outside the majority can offer resistance." 75 This association of modern democracy with the notion of "irresistible" power was more than a peculiarity of semantics. As he went on later in the chapter, the worst feature of democratic government in the United States was "not its weakness as many people in Europe claim, but its irresistible strength." 76 This raised questions not only about the capacity of minorities to resist majorities, but also about the logic of individual resistance to democratically-legitimated sovereign decisions tout court. Earlier in the book he had made a similar point which came very close to Constant's anxieties about the Bonapartist usurpation of popular democratic legitimacy. According to Tocqueville, "There is nothing so irresistible as a tyrannical power that commands in the name of the people, because, while vested with the moral power that belongs to the will of the greatest number, it acts at the same time with the decisiveness, promptitude and tenacity that a single man would have." 77 We might initially conclude that an incapacity to resist majority domination was a key feature of Tocqueville's description of democracy itself, or at least its more pathological expressions.
The diminished capacity for resistance that Tocqueville associated with democratic societies stood in sharp contrast with the greater vitality of resistance in aristocratic societies. On this issue, Tocqueville's thinking was even closer to Montesquieu's Spirit of the Laws than Constant's had been, although he was probably also building on the philosophical histories of civilization of the period of the Restoration, notably those of Guizot, whose lectures he had attended. 78 In his History of Civilization, Guizot had described the principle of resistance as 75 one of the legacies of the feudal system (as opposed to Rome or Christianity) to modern Europe, while celebrating the transition from "individual" to "legal" resistance that accompanied the progress of society. 79 Tocqueville resistance far exceeding that of democratic societies. In the 1836 essay he suggested that this was owing less to "institutions" than to "usages and manners" (moeurs) -a distinction familiar to any reader of Montesquieu. 81 In Democracy in America, Tocqueville had in fact identified a variety of institutions -noble prerogatives; sovereign courts; corporations;
provincial assemblies -which "while softening the blows of authority, maintained a spirit of Then you saw men who, despite their impotence, still maintained a high idea of their individual value, and dared to resist in isolation the exertion of public power.
But today, when all classes are merging together, when the individual disappears more and more in the crowd and is easily lost amid the common obscurity;
today, when nothing any longer sustains man above himself, because monarchical honor has nearly lost its dominion without being replaced by virtue, who can say where the exigencies of power and the indulgencies of weakness would stop? 83 Tocqueville repeatedly emphasised the extraordinary power of aristocratic moeurs in fashioning a basis for resisting sovereign power. The despotic alternative to modern democracy would be characterised precisely by the absence of the "collective resistance" that had sustained the "old monarchy, moderated by mores." 84 Or again: "What resistance is offered by mores that have already given way so many times?" 85 He made very similar points in the Ancien Regime and the Revolution, where he claimed that a combination of moeurs, customs and even abuses served to sustain the "spirit of resistance" against the centralizing projects of the ancien régime monarchy. 86 But he also implied that, beyond moeurs, there was something distinctive about the decentralised organisation of aristocratic societies that made them particularly equipped for resistance. 87 As he surmised in the 1840 volume, one of the reasons for this was the economic self-sufficiency of the aristocracy, and another was the deep isolation in which the citizens of democratic countries lived. 88 While it was "democratic governments that arrive most quickly at administrative centralization while losing their political liberty," aristocracies "struggle an infinitely longer time, because the power of resistance is great in each of the parts of the social body organised in this way." 89 This even had implications for war and military defence: aristocratic nations possessed "centres of resistance" that made them far harder to conquer than democratic countries. 90 Tocqueville thus adduced two diverging sources for the weakness of resistance in democratic societies. One of these was directly related to the politics of majority rule and majority tyranny, while another sprang from the social equality of conditions and the forms of societal isolation that left no barriers between individuals and the state. Two further features of
Tocqueville's account of resistance can be mentioned more briefly. One additional dimension of the problem was what we might term "intellectual resistance," the capacity for opposing the soft despotism of public opinion and the creeping moral and intellectual conformity that Tocqueville associated especially with highly commercialised societies (such as the July Monarchy). 91 As he remarked of the class of small property owners who amounted to the majority in many modern states, this class "empowers ideas and shapes mores (moeurs)," while it "makes its opinions, like its will, prevail everywhere, and even those who are most inclined to resist its commands end up letting themselves be led its examples." 92 And as he remarked in the context of a discussion of religion, "common opinion appears more and more as the first and most irresistible of all powers; outside of it there is no support strong enough to allow resistance to its blows for long." 93 We might say that Tocqueville adjusted the meaning of resistance in the light of the new threats to individual liberty that derived from majority opinion and the oppressive weight of conventional moeurs. As he also noted in the 1840 volume, "the same men who from time to time overturn a throne and trample kings underfoot, bow more and more, without resistance, to the slightest will of a clerk." This aligned with his commitment to a form of Enlightened self-interest as opposed to more demanding and self-abnegating forms of civic virtue.
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Once again, my aim here is not to point out previously unrecognised features of Tocqueville's thought, but rather to stress how intimately some of the best known of these features were tied to the topic of resistance. This is especially true of his famous concept of association, which provided perhaps the most viable prospect for a revival of resistance in democratic ages. "Among democratic peoples," Tocqueville declared, "it is only by association that the resistance of citizens to the central power can come about…". 97 Given that the principal reason for the failure of resistance in democracies lay in the isolation of citizens from each other, this identification of "association" as the cornerstone of resistance is unsurprising. Various forms of civic, municipal, industrial, and professional association could act as surrogate "aristocratic persons" in democratic ages, performing the most important task of the old aristocracy in opposing, contesting, and resisting sovereign power: 95 In this manner several of the greatest advantages of aristocracy would be obtained, without its injustices or its dangers. A political, industrial, commercial, or even scientific or literary association is an enlightened and powerful citizen whom you cannot bend at will or oppress in the shadow, and who, by defending its particular rights against the demands of power, saves common liberties.
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Resistance in this sense did not require any special degree of public virtue or patriotism on the part of associations, but simply a more limited willingness to protect its "particular rights." But as the passage suggests, the (self-interested) commitment of associations to the defence of their particular rights contributed to the maintenance of collective freedoms.
Tocqueville's second suggestion was to build "centres of resistance" into the structure of the constitution itself. As he added in a note to his chapter on the federal constitution, it was a question of neutralising the appeal to force by multiplying the "legal means of action and of resistance." 99 Sceptics may charge that by this point the language of resistance has been emptied of its radical promise as a doctrine of extra-constitutional civic action. That argument can legitimately be made, but the more limited point here is that Tocqueville often had recourse to the vocabulary of resistance in his description of how modern democratic constitutions actually functioned. This is particularly visible in some of his accounts of how the executive, legislative, and judicial powers related to each other. Something of this comes through in his discussion of the courts or the judicial power, which he saw as an essential guarantee of rights and interests in democratic centuries. 100 In this sense he echoed 103 It reflects a more nuanced understanding of the constitutional mechanics of resistance, in which the executive power not only required resisting but also had to resist in its turn.
The language of resistance also applied to the structure of the federal union itself, although here the position was more complicated. Historical examples of federal constitutions, Tocqueville argued, had failed to resolve the tension between power and resistance that characterised struggles between federal government and individual states. The outcome for the Dutch or the Swiss confederations had been the usurpation of a single powerful state (i.e.
Holland) or the gradual dissolution of the union itself (i.e. Switzerland). 104 One advantage of the American system, and the feature that made it "stand out as a great discovery in the political science of today," was that it had mitigated, without entirely neutralising, the capacity for state resistance to federal authority. This arose from the extension of the authority of federal power to individuals, and not just individual states. Tocqueville conceded that "the national spirit, collective passions, provincial prejudices of each state still strongly tend to diminish the extent of federal power so constituted, and to create centers of resistance to the will of the federal power." 105 But the intricate design of the American system meant that the resistance of individual states to federal authority was now restricted to situations of extremity: "In America, each state has far fewer opportunities and temptations to resist; and if the thought occurs, the state can act on it only by openly violating the laws of the Union, by interrupting the ordinary course of justice, and by raising the standard of revolt.
In a word, it must suddenly take an extreme position, something men hesitate to do for a long time." 106 Again, there was something novel in this ascription of the language of resistance to the analysis of a federal political structure.
Conclusion
The analysis developed here suggests that political ideas of resistance were significantly reshaped in the aftermath of the French Revolution, as theorists confronted the consequences of attempts to ground modern state authority on popular sovereignty or democratic foundations. Whereas a long tradition of early modern resistance theory had identified a more-or-less coherent "people" as the natural bearer of the right to resist, post-revolutionary theorists had to confront a more complex picture, characterised by the ostensible identity between the people and its representatives. The political and conceptual conundrum raised by this was to identify criteria for legitimately resisting governments which claimed to represent the people and to act in its name. Constant's preoccupation with the politics of Both Constant and Tocqueville implied that a genuinely representative political system must be able to house a "spirit of resistance" to sovereign power. But they offered contrasting responses to these dilemmas. It is sometimes suggested that Constant maintained a steady faith in the ability of the mechanisms of public opinion and commercial self-interest to frustrate the atavistic designs of authoritarian leaders. 107 Yet despite this, he continued to lay weight on the preparedness of modern citizens to resist governmental oppression and encroachment. In this respect, a robust willingness and capacity to engage in resistance, and thereby to defend a variety of rights, was a more significant guarantee of the "liberty of the moderns" than is often recognised. Tocqueville, despite his emphasis on the power of moeurs in motivating resistance, reposed little faith in ideals of virtuous civic resistance, and instead focused more on the role of local associations and constitutional structures in constituting "centres of resistance" to sovereign power. Although Constant himself had travelled some distance in this direction in his emphasis on local patriotic connections, Tocqueville appears to have gone furthest in shifting the question of resistance away from the juridical language of rights and duties, and instead reframing it as a property of a distinctive set of societal and constitutional arrangements. On this view, resistance was no longer a matter of the popular exercise of a distinctive set of rights, but rather a result of an interlocking set of social and political institutions that prevented the domination of the political system by any single unitary power. As I remarked above, this effort to "institutionalise resistance" may appear to drain resistance of its radical promise as doctrine of extra-constitutional action, but for liberals of Tocqueville's generation, that may have been part of the point.
